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State v. Merlino, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 65 (Sept. 10, 2015)1 
CRIMINAL LAW: BURGLARY 
 
Summary 
 
 The issue before the Court was whether selling stolen property through a retractable 
sliding tray on a pawn shop’s drive-through window satisfied the element of unlawful entry of a 
building as defined in the burglary statute. The Court held that when the outer boundary of a 
building is not self-evident from the shape and contours of the structure itself, courts must apply 
California’s “reasonable belief” test which legally defines the outer boundary to include, “any 
element that encloses an area into which a reasonable person would believe that a member of the 
general public could not pass without authorization.”  
 
Background 
 
 Merlino and her boyfriend took jewelry from their friend and neighbor Teresa Wilson, 
and pawned the jewelry without her knowledge. Merlino was charged and convicted for 
conspiracy to commit a crime, grand larceny, and three counts of burglary. The appeal before the 
Court challenged one of the three counts of burglary (“count five”). Count five charged Merlino 
with entering a pawn shop with intent to obtain money under false pretenses. Merlino pawned 
the items through a drive-through window of the store. The transaction involved Merlino placing 
the jewelry on a metal retractable sliding tray, and the pawn shop employee pulling the tray back 
into the store, then the employee slid the tray back to Merlino after placing documents and 
money on the tray. Merlino could only access the tray when the employee extended it, when 
retracted the tray was enclosed entirely within the building and could not be accessed from the 
outside. Given this evidence, the district court instructed the jury that an entry is complete when 
any portion of the intruder’s body penetrates the space inside the walls of the building. The state 
argued that the sliding tray constituted part of the building and thus, Merlino entered the building 
by using the tray. Merlino contended that no part of her body entered the building, and thus, no 
entry occurred.  
 
Discussion 
 
 Merlino argued there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction on count five. 
The test for sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case was “whether, after viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”2 Merlino argued the “entry” element 
of burglary was not met.  
                                                          
1  By Brittany L. Shipp. 
2  McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571,573 (1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979)).  
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 In Nevada, for purposes of burglary, entry is defined by NRS § 193.0145, which provides 
in relevant part:  
 
“Enter . . . includes the entrance of the offender, or the insertion of 
any part of the body of the offender, or of any instrument or 
weapon held in the offender’s hand and used or intended to be used 
to threaten or intimidate a person, or to detach or remove 
property.”3 
  
Since there was no evidence of Merlino using a weapon, or otherwise threatening or 
intimidating the pawn shop employee during the commission of the crime; the question before 
the Court was whether evidence existed showing that part of Merlino’s body or something in her 
hand entered the building within the meaning of the statute.  
 
The Court determined that there was a gap in Nevada’s statutory scheme in resolving 
whether such an entry occurred in this case because the statute defining building did not 
delineate where the outer boundary of a building begins and ends, for purposes of determining 
when an entry has occurred. 4 Thus, the Court looked outside of Nevada’s statutory scheme for 
guidance. 
 
The Court initially looked to Nevada common law.5 At common law, the crime of 
burglary was intended to protect the sanctity of residences in the night when dwellers were likely 
to be vulnerable. Most states replaced the common-law crime with broader definitions in statute, 
which encompassed not only residences, but other structures like vehicles and commercial 
buildings. Thus, it has become one of the most general forms of crime.  
 
Nevada also replaced the common law crime of burglary in statute; however Nevada 
never defined building in a manner that objectively determines when a building has been entered. 
In reviewing the common law, the Court found that the most widely used legal test for defining 
when a building has been entered was determining whether the “airspace” contained within it 
had been penetrated.6 
 
                                                          
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.0145. 
4  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.0125. 
5  See Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249, 285 (1872) (stating that the common law, “so far as it is not repugnant to or 
inconsistent with, the constitution or the laws of the united States, or the laws of the  territory of Nevada, shall be the 
rule of decision in all courts of this territory . . . [the common law] should remain in force until repealed by the 
legislature” (internal quotations omitted)).  
6  See People v. Davis, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 781, 958 P.2d 1083, 1094 (1998)(Baxter, J., dissenting); Gant v. State, 
640 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), receded from on other grounds by Norman v. State, 676 So. 2d 7 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
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Most states determined that a structure’s outer boundary was generally understood to 
include its roof, walls, doors and windows.7 However, in an age where buildings have many 
exterior features such as awnings or rolling shutters, the outer boundaries of a building are no 
longer as easily recognizable. Thus, the Court determined that the “airspace” test was becoming 
increasingly subjective and arbitrary. 
 
The Court cited numerous cases in which courts applying the airspace test struggled with 
slight details such as the distinction between an inner window and an outer window, or whether 
the distance between a roof and ceiling falls consists of “airspace” within a home.8 
 
Consequently, the Court looked to California’s test for determining whether a building 
had been entered and the location of boundary.  California’s burglary statute substantially similar 
to Nevada’s,9 and the California courts have expressly rejected the “airspace” test.10 Instead, 
California has supplemented the “airspace” test with a “reasonable belief” test, which defines 
outer boundary as “any element that encloses an area into which a reasonable person would 
believe that a member of the general public could not pass without authorization.”11 Since the 
Nevada Supreme Court has recently concluded that the scope and purpose of Nevada’s burglary 
statute follows California’s burglary statute in important respects,12 the Court considered 
California’s jurisprudence in determining whether a building has been entered.  
 
The Court then concluded that when the outer boundary of a building is not self-evident 
from the shape and contours of the structure itself, the outer boundary is legally defined to 
include, “any element that encloses an area into which a reasonable person would believe that a 
member of the general public could not pass without authorization.”13 Yet, if the outer boundary 
is self-evident that the common law “airspace test may be applied, however the Court noted that 
in future cases the district courts should consider utilizing the reasonable belief test as a jury 
instruction when the jury is tasked with defining the outer boundary of a structure.  
 
                                                          
7  See State v. Holt, 352 P.3d 702, 706 (N.M. Ct. App.)(citation omitted), cert. granted, __P.3d__(N.M. Ct. App. 
2015); State v. Kindred, 307 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). 
8  See Commonwealth v. Burke, 392 Mass. 688, 691, 467 N.E.2d 846, 849 (1984); Kindred, 307 P.3d at 1040-41; 
State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Mo. 1958); Miller v. State, 187 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
9  See, e.g., State v. White, 130 Nev.__,__ n.1, 330 P.3d 482, 485 n.1 (2014) ("California's burglary statute is nearly 
identical to Nevada's. . . ."); Cal. Penal Code § 459 (West 2010). 
10  See People v.Valencia, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 137, 46 P.3d 920 925 (2002); People v. Nible, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396, 
399 (Ct. App. 1988) ("in our view, the 'air space' test, although useful in some situations, is inadequate as a 
comprehensive test for determining when a burglarious entry occurs"). 
11  Valencia, 46 P.3d at 926. 
12  See State v. White, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 56, 330 P.3d 482, 485 (2014) ("We agree with the analysis of the 
California Supreme Court in [People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365 (Cal. 1975)], which relied upon these policies to reach 
the conclusion that a person with an absolute right to enter a structure cannot commit burglary of that structure."). 
13  Valencia, 46 P.3d at 926. 
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The Court then applied the “reasonable belief” test to the facts of this case because it 
supplied a superior method for identifying the protected outer boundary of a structure 
considering the building’s unorthodox features such as the sliding tray. The Court determined 
that the dispositive question in this case was whether Merlino crossed the outer boundary of the 
building. Thus, the inquiry under the reasonable belief test was whether the open tray, 
constituted a component that enclosed an area in which a reasonable person would believe was 
not accessible to a member of the general public.  
 
The Court concluded it does constitute such a component, because the natural operation 
of the tray was retractable and was usually opened and closed by the pawn shop employee. When 
the tray was closed it rested entirely within the perimeter of the building and could not be 
accessed from outside the building. It was only opened and made accessible to the customer 
when the pawn shop employee manually pushed the tray out toward the customer so that it was 
temporarily extended beyond the perimeter of the building. Therefore, when the tray was 
retracted in its closed position, no reasonable person would believe that it was accessible to a 
member of the general public without authorization. When the tray opened, however, it was 
extended outward beyond the perimeter of the wall, and occupied an area outside of the wall. No 
reasonable person would believe that accessing that area at that time would threaten the owner's 
permanent possessory rights in the building.14  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court held the sliding tray fails the "reasonable belief' test because the retractable 
tray was more analogous to a tool used to move objects into and out of the outer boundary of the 
building, and thus it was not a part of the boundary itself. While Merlino placed the stolen items 
into the tray, Merlino did not operate the tray, but rather the Pawn Shop employee’s actions 
caused the tray to enter the building. Thus, Merlino’s actions did not equate to a criminal entry of 
the building, and the entry element of burglary was not met.  
                                                          
14  See People v. Davis, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 776, 958 P.2d 1083, 1089 (1998) (holding that passing a forged check 
through the window chute of a business's walk-up window did not constitute a burglarious entry, because doing so 
did not violate the owner's possessory interest in the building). 
